President loser? Edvard Beneš and the Munich crisis of 1938 in the context of History textbooks

To compare the interpretations of the Munich crisis of 1938 and Beneš 'role in the History textbooks and, in contrast to these textbook interpretations, to show how Beneš' role in the crisis of 1938 evaluates contemporary historical research is the main aim of this study. For this analysis was chosen the method of the text analysis of selected History textbooks for primary and secondary schools from the communist regime and textbooks published under the conditions of a free political regime after 1989. The second part of the study is an analysis of the Beneš's strategy in solving the Munich crisis and its foreign and internal political limits. The main conclusions of the study: the Munich crisis demonstrated for the first time the limits of Beneš's political strategy. The crisis was lost, because it was caused by forces that he did not control, which he was not able to influence much, and which mainly did not respect his attitudes, and forced him to submit to their will. At the same time, however, he himself became the center of attention and literally the hope of the whole nation, without having sufficient influence, powers or powers for the positive resolution of the crisis. In dealing with the crisis, he has put his proven diplomatic ability for years to reach a compromise solution at all costs, even in the most complex situations. However, in 1938 his opponents with him did not want to agree on any compromise.

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Tato studie vznikla v rámci řešení vědecko-výzkumného záměru Metropolitní univerzity Praha "Politické vědy, kultura, média, jazyk, kód projektu 57-01", financovaného z podpory na Dlouhodobý a koncepční rozvoj výzkumné organizace v roce 2018.